Dragon Ball Z Uncensored

[8 bit orgy]

Recently my professor posted an abstract on the public relations strategy NASA used before, during, and after the Columbia tragedy. Now, I've read a few conspiracy theories regarding the event, and was very unimpressed. Conspiracies are usually built on motive. I wouldn't know why NASA would want to blow up Columbia other than perhaps they just didn't want to use the shuttle anymore (it's generally accepted the the shuttle program is a major flop and that NASA is actually the strongest critic of it. Politicians keep pushing the shuttle program because it involves the least amount of investment).


What you are about to read has never been posted on the internet and I'm probably exposing myself to possible legal reprecautions for doing so. The point is that before I blurt out possible angles of a conspiracy, I want the reader to independently come to any conclusions themselves. A few things to point out before reading. Take note that a four star general was hired as the independent investigator of a non-military crash scene. Take note of the large amount of coincidences regarding the crisis management strategy after the tragedy and apparently BEFORE and DURING the tragedy. Finally, take note on NASA's obsession with protecting it's image over justifying its mechanical and technical nature.

Without further delay, Lost in space: A critique of NASA’s crisis communications in the Columbia disaster.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rL1oU6fH25w

[8 bit orgy]

Public Relations Review 31 (2005) 263–275
Lost in space: A critique of NASA’s crisis communications in the Columbia disaster
James Kauffman∗

Department of Communication Studies, Indiana University Southeast, 4201 Grant Line Road, NewAlbany , IN 47150, USA
Received 5 November 2004; received in revised form 31 January 2005; accepted 1 February 2005

Abstract
The explosion of space shuttle Columbia on 1 February 2003 shocked the nation and threatened to destroy
the image and confidence NASA had labored years to restore in the wake of its poor handling of the Challenger
disaster. This paper examines NASA’s crisis communications regarding Columbia’s explosion. It argues that the
space agency did most things right in responding to the crisis, but it made errors that reflect serious and long-standing
problems with its organizational culture. The paper concludes that NASA’s handling of the crisis ultimately helped
the agency to maintain good will with Congress, the media, and the American public. It proposes that the space
agency must fix flaws with its organizational culture, or it may be forced into the unenviable position of relying on
crisis communications to protect its image and reputation.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Columbia disaster; Space shuttle; NASA

1. Introduction
At 9:10 a.m. on 1 February 2003, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) lost
communications with space shuttle Columbia 16 min before its scheduled landing at Kennedy Space
Center in Florida. Rocked by multiple explosions, Columbia disintegrated over Texas, killing the seven
astronauts and spreading debris across a several hundred mile radius over Texas and Louisiana. The media
began reporting on the accident immediately. “Television viewers around the globe sat in anguish as video
∗ Tel.: +1 812 941 2256; fax: +1 812 941 2529.
E-mail address: jkauffm@ius.edu.
0363-8111/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2005.02.013
264 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275
footage of the tragedy, captured by professional cameramen and amateurs alike, played over and over
again” (Cantrell & Vaughan, 2003, p. 5). NASA’s response to the crisis would be critical to the space
agency.
At stake not only was NASA’s image, which it had labored 17 years to restore in the wake of the
Challenger explosion and the agency’s disastrous handling of the crisis, but also congressional and public
support for the agency and America’s human space exploration program (Davidson, 2003). “Columbia’s
destruction,” asserted Cabbage and Harwood (2004), “left the nation one failure away from the potential
abandonment of human space exploration” (p. xiii). Critics quickly called for the elimination of the space
shuttle program (Biddle, 2003; Easterbrook, 2003; Krugman, 2003). As Freemantle and Tolson (2003)
observed, unlike the tragedies of Apollo 1 and Challenger, the Columbia accident forced the nation to
confront “long-standing concerns” about the efficacy and direction of America’s human space exploration
program (p. A1).

2. Initial praise
Observers praised NASA’s initial response to the tragedy, a sharp contrast to the assessment the agency
received for its handling of the Challenger explosion. Jenkins (2003) labeled NASA’s response to the
Columbia tragedy “a crisis-communications triumph” and proposed that it could serve as a “handbook”
for managing crises (p. 8); Zeeck (2003) gushed that “NASA is now giving a tuition-free tutorial in
Advanced Public Relations 301: Crisis Communications” (p. A2); Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R.,
NY), chair of the House Science Committee, praised NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe for responding
“magnificently” during the crisis (Space Shuttle Columbia, 2003, p. 3); and Representative Sheila Jackson
Lee (D., TX) commended NASA’s “diligence, progress, and openness” in handling the crisis (p. 8).
Even the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003), which provided a blistering critique of
Columbia, the space shuttle program, and NASA management and culture, praised the agency for “publicly
and forthrightly” informing the nation about the accident and all “associated information” as it
became available. The Board declared that NASA’s crisis communications could be a “source of national
pride” (p. 6).1

3. Not an unqualified success
Yet, contrary to the glowing assessments the space agency received for its crisis communications,
NASA’s response to the explosion was not an unqualified success. The agency made mistakes in responding
to the crisis that reflect serious problems with its organizational culture. This paper examines NASA’s
crisis communications regarding the space shuttle Columbia explosion. It argues that NASA’s handling of
the crisis ultimately helped the agency to maintain good will with Congress, the media, and the American
public, but that it also highlighted and reflected serious and long-standing problems with the agency’s
organizational culture. The paper proposes that NASA must address the problems with its organizational
culture, thereby reducing the likelihood of future accidents and making the agency less reliant on crisis
communications to protect its image and reputation with stakeholders.
1 For similar assessments of NASA’s crisis communications response, see Barron, 2003; Dickey, 2003; Gustin&Sheehy, 2003.
J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275 265
During a crisis like the Columbia explosion, an organization must communicate effectively with its
publics to minimize damage to the organization’s image. Fern-Banks (1996) has defined crisis communications
as “communication between the organization and its publics prior to, during, and after the
negative occurrence” (p. ix). Effective communication cannot only defuse or eliminate a crisis, but it can
sometimes “bring the organization a more positive reputation than before the crisis” (p. 6).
Johnson & Johnson’s handling of the Tylenol poisonings stands as one of the best examples of an organization
enhancing its public image through effective crisis communications (Fern-Banks, pp. 148–149;
Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 1994, p. 59). NASA must be especially vigilant in maintaining public trust and
confidence for two reasons. First, the agency receives the vast majority of its funding from Congress.
Therefore, NASA must maintain public and congressional trust and confidence to maintain funding. Second,
the agency must, by law, keep Congress and the American public informed regarding its operations.
NASA has a more difficult time than businesses and many other federal agencies simply refusing to
provide information about itself, information that might damage its credibility and threaten its funding.
The space agency responded well to the crisis because it created, practiced, and followed a contingency,
or crisis communications, plan. In the wake of its disastrous handling of the Apollo 1 fire in 1967, the
space agency developed a crisis communications plan, which it employed effectively when dealing with
Apollo 13’s harrowing mission (Kauffman, 1999, 2001). However, it failed to follow the plan when
Challenger exploded (Marshall, 1986). The agency vowed not to make the same mistake in the event of
future shuttle accidents.


4. Crisis plan priorities
Recognizing the importance of effective crisis communications, NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe
made it a top priority when he became head of the agency in 2001. His first day on the job, O’Keefe
(2003b) asked managers to share with him the agency’s plan for responding to a mishap like Challenger
(p. 2). He asked that the meeting occur “within an hour” of his request so managers would not feel they
had to “run off and make something up, that they’d just pull off the shelf what was there” (Space Shuttle
Columbia, 2003, p. 136).
O’Keefe and the managers reviewed the document in light of the agency’s public response to Challenger.
He learned that since 1986, NASA had altered the plan to more fully integrate public communications
into its long list of required tasks (O’Keefe, 2003b, p. 2). In a speech about NASA’s public response to
Columbia, O’Keefe (2003b) pointed out thatNASAupdated its contingency plan before each shuttle flight.
NASArevised its space flight operations contingency plan in January 2003, only weeks before the tragedy.
The Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations (NASA, 2003a), a thorough and
detailed crisis communications plan, identifies the “pre-planned contingency response” to a space flight
problem, defining six “mishap categories” for which a contingency response is required and assigning
responsibility for each action taken by the agency (p. 1).
Not only did NASA develop and update a crisis plan, but it rehearsed the plan, too. O’Keefe (2003b)
viewed it as “critical” that the agency practice its contingency plan “on a regular basis” (p. 2). In mid-
November 2002, just three months before the Columbia accident, NASA ran an accident simulation.
O’Keefe noted a “glaring deficiency” in the plan: the agency did not include its public affairs staff in
the simulations. “We revised the plan immediately to correct this oversight,” (p. 2) he recalled. O’Keefe
found the simulation crucial not only to helping the agency identify strengths and weaknesses, but also
266 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275
in developing a familiarity that helped them to respond more effectively: “We found that in our time
of crisis, the ability to lean on these tools enabled us to set aside our emotions and concentrate on the
requirements of the moment” (p. 2).
Undoubtedly, familiarity with the plan paid off for the agency. NASA Associate Administrator for
Space Flight Bill Readdy carried a copy of NASA’s contingency plan with him to every flight. Readdy
and O’Keefe, waiting at the Kennedy Space Center runway for the arrival of Columbia on the morning of
February 1, immediately left for the Launch Control Center when the shuttle did not arrive at its scheduled
time. Upon arriving at the Center at 9:29 a.m., Readdy declared a contingency. They immediately began
implementing the agency’s contingency plan. O’Keefe addressed the first item on the list: notification
of the president. After a brief conversation, the two agreed that O’Keefe would hold a press conference
at 1:00 p.m.; the president would make a statement at 2:00 p.m. Continuing to follow the contingency
plan, O’Keefe next contacted the Homeland Security Advisor, soon to be Secretary, Tom Ridge. The two
discussed the possibility that Columbia’s explosion was an act of terrorism. They quickly discounted the
possibility. NASA continued to follow the plan closely as it responded to the tragedy.

4.1. Controlling the flowof information
NASA had to respond promptly to the crisis. The first rule of crisis communications is to control the
flow of information (Barron, 2003). Organizations need to remain in control as the source of information
during a crisis. If an organization does not respond to a crisis in a timely fashion, then an information
vacuum is created. When faced with an information vacuum, the media will seek information elsewhere.
Often, the sources of information from which the media receives its information are not well informed,
may have a negative opinion of the organization, may have an alternative perspective, or may speculate
about the causes of the crisis.
Instant and continuous media coverage today make its essential that an organization provide not only
a prompt response to a crisis, but a continuous flow of information. News of Columbia’s explosion broke
within minutes of the accident, and the major news organizations began continuous coverage, repeatedly
replaying footage of the shuttle’s fatal dissent and updating information as it became available. The visual
and instantaneous nature of television made Columbia a natural and attractive story: “Televisionwas there
again for a nation in shock, providing the latest and most thorough information available on a story that,
for at least a few hours, galvanized the American public” (Television news, 2003, p. 10). The media
performed admirably in the first few hours of covering the story, but by Saturday afternoon, they had run
out of news.
Typically, an organization facing a crisis lacks reliable information. Although tempting, an organization
is well advised not to speculate beyond the facts it possesses. Such was the case with Columbia. “NASA
officials did their best to provide information to the demanding members of the press, but in the first
few hours of the disaster there was little to give” (Cantrell & Vaughan, 2003, pp. 33–34). However,
the competitive nature of the media created a demand for information that dictated the coverage. Once
the news about Columbia’s accident had run out on Saturday afternoon, the media succumbed to the
“inevitable: the catchy graphics packages, the dreaded parade of marginal ‘experts’ and endless hours of
pointless speculation from talking heads, as each news outlet scrambled to trump the competition in a
futile search for an angle that had not already been beaten to death” (Television news, 2003, p. 10).
The space agency responded quickly to the crisis. O’Keefe (2003b) explained that NASA immediately
“seized control of the public communication high ground and we maintained it” (p. 4). In addition to
J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275 267
announcing the contingency plan, the agency informed the public that O’Keefe would make a statement
at 1:00 p.m. and that it would hold a press conference at 3:00 p.m. from its Johnson Space Center. The
press conference, led by NASA’s Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore, lasted over 2 h and
received high marks for the openness and candor of NASA officials.
Finally, NASA explained that in accord with its contingency plan, it had activated both an internal and
an external investigation team. The external team, O’Keefe stressed, would be independent of NASA,
consisting of a number of specialists, mostly from government agencies and chaired by retired Navy
Admiral Harold Gehman. The agency worked tirelessly over the next few days to communicate with
its publics. For example, O’Keefe made the morning talk-show circuit on Sunday and Monday. He
expressed the agency’s sorrow, explained what NASA knew and how it would proceed, and pledged that
it was already working toward finding the cause of the accident and fixing it so that the shuttle would
return to flight, and human space exploration would continue.

5. Television and Internet
NASA used television and the Internet to great effect in communicating promptly and openly with
its publics. O’Keefe (2003b) highlighted the “significant role” NASA television played in the agency’s
“communications activities” during the crisis (p. 4). O’Keefe recognized the agency’s “unique,” in-house
television capability for providing news footage for broadcasters and conducting interviews from its
headquarters studio. The day following the accident, recalled O’Keefe, “I was able to appear on all
network Sunday morning news shows, while staying in close touch with our recovery effort” (p. 4). In
the days following the accident, the agency used NASA television to conduct press conferences to update
the public on its recovery efforts, to provide networks the opportunity to interview crewmembers of the
International Space Station, and to broadcast testimony before the external accident investigation board
and congressional committees.
The agency made use of the Internet, too. O’Keefe pointed to a lucky coincidence regarding the accident
and NASA’s webpage. “The night before the accident,” he disclosed, “NASA inaugurated a new Web
portal to make it easier for the public to navigate through our Web offerings” (p. 4). Within the first
24 h after the tragedy, the site received 49 million hits, a record for NASA. O’Keefe proposed that the
agency later learned that its old site would have collapsed because of the tremendous traffic. The agency
continually posted and updated information about Columbia on the page. “Throughout February, with a
Columbia memorial section prominently displayed,” O’Keefe explained, “our web site received nearly
530 million hits, almost as many hits in a single month as the old site got last year” (p. 4). NASA’s web
presence did not go unnoticed. The agency’s crisis site, updated frequently, and linked to its home page,
was “a solid source on everything from space shuttle debris to the investigation process” (Barron, 2003,
p. 26).

6. A swift and open response
The space agency received high praise for its swift response to the Columbia accident. Jenkins (2003)
applauded the space agency for responding promptly: “By going public right away, NASA prevented an
information vacuum that would have been filled with self-styled experts and analysts, whose personal
268 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275
biases would have set the communications agenda” (p. 8). Gustin and Sheehy (2003) praised the agency
for the “speed” with which it conducted its the first news conference and the “frequent updates” that
it began broadcasting “within the hour of initial reports of the problem” (p. 5). Similarly, Sappenfield
(2003) attested to the agency’s promptness: “Never before have accident investigators shared so much
data with the public so quickly” (p. 2).
Not only didNASArespond promptly, it also responded openly. Observers underscored the openness of
the agency and pointed out the sharp contrast with its handling of the Challenger accident. Clearly, NASA
had learned its lesson from its abysmal response to the shuttle explosion 17 years earlier. The agency
worked tirelessly to open the organization and share its information about Columbia and the accident.
As Ron Dittemore commented, the agency had broken precedent by sharing information so quickly and
completely that the agency itself did not fully comprehend its significance or meaning (NASA, 2003h,
p. 6). The agency released volumes of information and raw data in various ways. It used the Internet
to disseminate a great deal of the information, making access continuous and simple. O’Keefe (2003b)
summarized NASA’s approach, proposing that the agency released information “whether it seemed to
benefit the Agency or not,” understanding that “in the end,” openness was paramount. “News doesn’t
improve with age,” he observed. “In fact, if you hold back, you are likely to take even more hits, and
deservedly so” (p. 4).
The space agency received high praise for its openness and candor. Johnson (2003) referred to NASA’s
openness as “stunning” (p. 4d); the Seattle Times applauded the agency’s “surprising candor and openness”
(NASA once again, 2003, p. A3) while the Worcester Telegram & Gazette pointed to the space agency’s
“new era of candor” (Charting a path, 2003, p. A10). Senator John McCain (R., AZ), chairman of
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, applauded NASA for its “openness
and availability” in the aftermath of the tragedy (Space Shuttle Columbia, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, in a
letter to President George W. Bush criticizing the NASA-appointed board to investigate the accident,
sixteen Democratic members of the House Committee on Science nevertheless commended NASA for
the “openness” with which it had “shared information” about the Columbia accident with Congress and
the public (Cong. Democrats, 2003, p. 2).
Observers attested to the positive impact of NASA’s openness. Davidson (2003) argued that NASA’s
candor had drawn “sympathy and support for the agency” (p. A16). Rutenberg (2003) predicted that the
agency’s “openness could help it take some of the edge off criticism of its operations” (p. 23). Proposing
that reporters were giving NASA management the benefit of the doubt in covering the tragedy, Jurkowitz
(2003) asserted that NASA was “already reaping the rewards of its media-friendly strategy” (p. A22).
The agency’s openness reassured Congress, the media, and the public that the agency was not trying to
hide anything, not trying to protect itself. Its openness conveyed that it was willing to allow all observers
to view the agency, its data, and its operations surrounding the Columbia flight and tragedy.

7. NASA stumbles
Although NASA did most things right in responding to the Columbia explosion, it made mistakes
that reflect serious and long-standing problems with the agency’s organizational culture. The Columbia
Accident Investigation Board defined organizational culture as “the basic values, norms, beliefs, and
practices that characterize the functioning of a particular institution” (p. 101). Attempting to protect its
image and reputation, the space agency tried to control the investigation of the accident by appointing
J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275 269
the investigation board members, by making the board reliant upon NASA for support and funding, and
by requiring the board to report its findings to the space agency.
7.1. Attempting to control the investigation
NASA’s investigation board came under attack from the start. In the wake of the Challenger tragedy in
1986, the space agency altered its contingency plan to include a standing Mishap Investigation Board with
specified members from the military and government agencies with expertise in human flight and accident
investigation. O’Keefe attempted to justify the board by arguing that NASA could activate it quickly and
avoid delays in investigating a mishap. However, the board’s charter suggests that NASA hoped to control
the standing board and limit the scope of mishap investigations. For example, the charter declared that
the board would conduct its “activities in accordance with direction from the NASA administrator and
the provisions of applicable NASA management instructions” (NASA, 2003a, Appendix D). Further, the
plan stated that the board would “work with the NASA Administrator to schedule board activities, interim
board reports, and submission of the final board report.” Moreover, the charter explained that the board
would limit its investigation to determining the facts and cause of the mishap and recommending ways
to prevent future mishaps: “The investigation will not be conducted or used to determine questions of
culpability, legal liability, or disciplinary action.” The charter also states that the board would submit its
final report to NASA’s Administrator.
The media and congressional space committees questioned the independence of the board. Although
the space agency called the board “independent,” itwas aNASAcreation: O’Keefe appointed its members;
the space agency provided its budget and support staff; the charter limited the investigation to identifying
the cause of the accident; and, ultimately, the board would report its findings to NASA’s boss. Observers
questioned whether the board amounted to NASA investigating itself and asked why the space agency did
not follow the Challenger example and ask for a presidential commission to investigate the tragedy. The
issue of the board’s independence quickly flared up into “a political firestorm” (Cabbage & Harwood,
2004, p. 181).
The media attacked the board. For example, the State Journal-Register commented that “a NASA
independent panel is an oxymoron” and called for the agency to disband the panel and replace it with
one appointed by the White House (Look at NASA, 2003, p. 8). The St. Louis Post-Dispatch chastised
NASA, proposing it should have known not to “pack” its investigation board with “military personnel and
agency insiders” (The razor’s edge, 2003, p. B6). The Orlando Sentinel, questioning the independence
of the board, cautioned that “even the suspicion of a whitewash would be devastating for NASA” (Don’t
give up, 2003, p. A24).
Members of congressional space committees questioned the board’s independence. On February 6, 16
Democrats from the House Science Committee sent a letter to President Bush declaring that the group
appointed by the agency appeared “a non-independent board controlled by NASA” (Cong. Democrats,
2003, p. 2). They called on the president to re-draft the board’s charter to expand the board’s membership,
to have it report directly to the president and Congress, to have its support staff from outside of NASA,
and to expand its investigation to examine “contributory causes, management issues, and pressures on
the system” (p. 2). NASA felt the full force of Congress’s displeasure with the investigation board at
a joint hearing of the Senate and House space committees on February 12. In his opening remarks,
Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R., NY) demanded that NASA rewrite its charter to “guarantee”
its “independence.” He also called on the space agency to add members to the board (Space Shuttle
270 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275
Columbia, 2003, p. 3). Representative Bart Gordon (D., TN) attacked the control the charter gave to
NASA in the investigative process and told O’Keefe: “I am afraid this will not pass anybody’s smell
test of independence” (p. 81). Similarly, Senator Byron Dorgan (D., ND), called for the impanelling of
a presidential commission, telling O’Keefe “an agency can’t very effectively investigate itself” (p. 85).
Representative Nick Lampson (D., TX), criticized the board as “too closely tied” toNASA and pointed out
that to have “credibility,” the nation needed a “truly independent” board similar to the Rogers commission
(pp. 86–87).
Faced with pointed and persistent questioning about the board’s charter and independence, NASA
retreated and recapitulated. O’Keefe agreed to make changes to the board and its charter so that its
chairperson, Admiral Gehman, had “whatever he needs” to “guarantee the independence and objectivity
of the board” (p. 67). On February 18, NASA announced it had amended the board’s charter to allow
the board greater “flexibility” in adding support staff and experts outside of the agency. O’Keefe
proposed that NASA would continue to update the charter as necessary to “ensure” it “remains
independent during the continuing investigation” (NASA, 2003i, p. 1). NASA also announced the
addition of Dr. Sheila Widnall, a university professor. On March 5, NASA announced the addition
of three more university professors to the board, including former NASA astronaut Dr. Sally Ride
(NASA, 2003j).
NASA should have known that its attempts to control the investigation would come under attack and
potentially threaten its image and reputation at a critical time for the agency. The space agency tried to
do the same thing in the wake of the Apollo 1 fire, appointing its own board to investigate the tragedy.
The move provoked a blistering attack from the media and Congress (Kauffman, 1999). NASA’s desire
to protect its image and reputation by controlling the Columbia investigation appears to have blinded the
agency to how the media and Congress would view its action. Ironically, NASA’s attempt to protect its
image and reputation in this case had the opposite effect. The media and Congress questioned NASA’s
commitment to discovering the true causes of the accident; both wondered if the space agency had
something to hide.
7.2. Speculating about the accident’s cause
NASA made its biggest mistake when it speculated about the cause of the accident, a mistake that
reflected flaws in the agency’s organizational culture. At NASA’s initial press conference 6 h after the
accident, Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore discounted foam strikes as the cause of the
accident: “We don’t believe, at this time, that the impact of the ET debris on the tile was the cause of our
problem” (NASA, 2003b, p. 10). He assured his audience that NASA had reviewed debris shedding in the
past and concluded that debris impact on the tile did not represent “a safety-of-flight issue” (p. 13). Dittemore
maintained this position at the press conference the following day (NASA, 2003c). Prophetically,
he warned his audience of the possibility that “we’ll contradict ourselves from day to day” (p. 4).
When pressed about the foam strike at the February 3 press conference, Dittemore relayed the tentative
findings of an investigation tree and gave the impression that the foam strike was the cause of the accident:
“We’re making the assumption from the start that the external tank was the root cause of the problem that
lost the Columbia” (NASA, 2003d, p. 8). The press jumped on the new position. The misstep changed the
direction of the media coverage of the accident. Dittemore tried to correct the misperception on February
5, but he made another blunder: he “swung too far the opposite way” (Cabbage & Harwood, 2004, p.
185).
J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275 271
Early in the press conference on February 5, Dittemore told his audience that NASA engineers and
managers found it “difficult” to believe that “this particular piece of foam debris shedding from the tank
represented a safety-of-flight issue” (NASA, 2003e, p. 4). He all but dismissed the foam as a possible
cause of the accident: “Right now it just does not make sense to us that a piece of foam would be the root
cause for the loss of Columbia and its crew. There’s got to be another reason” (p. 4). Dittemore’s mistake
sent O’Keefe “through the roof” for speculating and drawing conclusions that were the purview of the
embattled investigation board. The error caused “another wide swing” in media coverage (Cabbage &
Harwood, 2004, p. 186).
The following day, O’Keefe engaged in damage control. In a statement from NASA headquarters,
NASA (2003f) declared that any conclusions about the cause of the accident would come from the
investigation board “and only from them” (p. 4). O’Keefe stressed that any viewNASA officials expressed
about the accident would not “foreclose,” close out,” or “eliminate any theory” or “conclusion” that could
be drawn because “only the Board” would be “authorized” to make such a conclusion (p. 4).
At his press conference on February 6, Dittemore also tried to repair the damage of the previous day.
“Let me emphasize that we have not ruled out any possible cause” (NASA, 2003g, p. 2). He tried to
backpedal regarding his dismissal of the foam strike as a possible cause of the accident. “And so even
though I mentioned to you I thought it was not one of the primary items in our mind, we are pursuing it
with great effort. No possibility is being ruled out” (p. 2).
The media pounced on the agency’s speculating and waffling. For example, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
zeroed in onNASA’s changing position: “OnTuesday, shuttle manager Ron Dittemore said the foam theory
was the focus of the investigation. OnWednesday,Mr. Dittemore said engineers had all but dismissed the
theory. On Thursday, the foam theory was back in the mix. By Friday, fuzzy photographs taken by the
Air Force appeared to show damage in the area of the shuttle’s son, called ‘wing glove,’ the spot where
foam had struck the orbiter” (The razor’s edge, 2003, p. B6). The Times-Picayune criticized NASA for
flip-flopping over the cause of the accident and for being “too eager” to identify a cause. The paper scolded
NASA: “It is folly to leap to conclusions” (Searching for a cause, 2003, p. 6). Murray (2003) reported
on O’Keefe’s efforts to end the speculating, pointing out that on February 6, the agency’s boss “blocked”
the agency from “altering” again “its stance” about what caused Columbia’s explosion and announcing
that all future declarations about the accident’s cause must come from the external investigation board
(p. A14).2
NASA admitted that it had made a mistake in speculating about the cause of the accident. At his
February 7 press conference, Dittemore reminded his audience that from the start, he had cautioned
people not to jump to conclusions. “I think over the past week you have witnessed an inside view of our
ups and downs as we attempted to steer a course throughout the week” (NASA, 2003h, p. 1). O’Keefe
was more direct. Reflecting on NASA’s crisis communications efforts regarding Columbia in a speech at
the 2003 Public Relations Society of America International Conference, O’Keefe (2003b) stressed that
during a crisis, it is “essential” not to “speculate about things unknown” (p. 4). He pointed out that the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board “appropriately took NASA to task for speculating on a matter on
which we had no certain knowledge, and indeed we were wrong” (p. 4). He pointed out that the agency’s
“ill-advised speculation” led to “some hits in the press” (p. 4).
2 For similar media coverage regarding NASA’s speculations about the cause of the accident, see Broder, 2003; Date, 2003;
Glanz, Sange, & Schwartz, 2003; Hemmer & Flock, 2003; Lunsford, 2003; Vedantam, 2003.
272 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275

8. Problems with NASA’s organizational culture
One may view NASA’s denials that the foam strikes caused the Columbia accident not simply as
misstatements in the heat of a crisis, but as a reflection of a serious problem with NASA’s organizational
culture. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003) identified flaws in NASA’s organizational
culture as a key cause of the accident (pp. 99–102, 121–204). Furthermore, the Board concluded that
many of the same flaws with NASA’s organizational culture that led to the Challenger accident also led
to the Columbia accident. The Board pointed out a systemic problem with NASA which caused it to
“normalize deviance,” or to accept the deviant (recurring problems with O-rings and foam strikes) as
routine and normal. The Board concluded that the Challenger and Columbia accidents occurred in large
part because NASA’s organizational culture led it to discount the hazards posed by the O-rings and foam
strikes and to use successful flights as evidence that the O-rings and the foam strikes were safe, in direct
contradiction of its own studies (pp. 195–204).3
With Columbia, NASA became blind to the dangers posed by foam strikes. It became convinced it
understood the foam debris; it became convinced of the “invincibility” of its “organizational and technical
systems” to identify whether foam strikes posed a serious threat (Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
2003 p. 199). The agency became so certain that foam strikes did not pose a serious hazard that not only
did it fail to set up procedures that would effectively monitor foam strikes, but it strongly dismissed foam
strikes as a potential cause of the accident while proclaiming it would not speculate about causes and
lecturing the media not to jump to conclusions. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board pointed out
how blind NASA had become to the threat posed by foam debris and how convinced the agency was in
the efficiency of its decision making:
So ingrained was the agency’s belief that foam debris was not a threat to flight safety that in press
briefings after the Columbia accident, the Space Shuttle Program Manager still discounted the foam as a
probable cause, saying that Shuttle managers were ‘comfortable’ with their previous risk assessment (p.
196).

9. Blunting impact of Board’s report
NASAtried to minimize the negative impact of the highly critical, final report of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board. The agency did so in three ways. First, during its investigation, the Board shared
some of its findings and recommendations with the space agency. Consequently, NASA was able to
make substantial progress on an implementation plan to return to flight, which responded to the report’s
specific criticisms and suggestions (Cabbage & Harwood, 2004, p. 264). Second, O’Keefe tried to blunt
the report’s criticisms by publishing an article in the Wall Street Journal on the day the Board released
it (O’Keefe, 2003a). In the article, O’Keefe applauded the work of the Board, pledged to implement all
of the findings and recommendations, and promised to return America’s human space exploration to its
former glory. Third, O’Keefe bent over backwards to praise the work of the board and to embrace its
findings before lawmakers (NASA’s Response, 2003, pp. 92–109).
NASA’s response to the report received praise from the media and lawmakers.
3 For a detailed analysis of the Challenger disaster, NASA’s organizational culture, and how the agency “normalized deviance,”
see Vaughan, 1996.
J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275 273
For example, the Orlando Sentinel labeled the agency’s initial response to the report “encouraging” (A
broken agency, 2003, p. G2). The Washington Post congratulated O’Keefe on “saying the right things” in
responding to the report (A crucial manned, 2003, p. A20), and the Times-Picayune applauded NASA’s
commitment to implementing the report’s recommendations as “an essential first step in rehabilitating a
troubled agency” (After Columbia, 2003, p. 6). Similarly, Representative Boehlert congratulated O’Keefe
and NASA for “their wholesale embrace” of the report and for the swiftness with which they put together
a detailed plan in response (NASA’s Response, 2003c, p. 5). Representative Tom Feeney (R., FL) commended
O’Keefe for fully embracing the report, “not only the words but also more importantly its spirit”
(NASA’s Response, 2003, p. 13).

10. Conclusion
NASA’s handling of the Columbia crisis ultimately helped to maintain confidence and trust in the
space agency. NASA demonstrated that it learned from its poor handling of the Challenger explosion; it
responded to the Columbia disaster with a well-rehearsed crisis plan that stressed promptness, openness,
and candor. The agency effectively used television and the Internet to communicate with its stakeholders.
It blunted the negative impact of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s blistering critique of
Columbia and the agency. However, the agency could not overcome flaws with its organizational culture
that led it to conclude that the foam debris could not have caused the accident and, based on that assumption,
to speculate about the accident’s cause. Further, NASA displayed an obsessive concern with protecting its
image. It created a detailed contingency plan that tried to exert control over the accident’s investigation.
The agency did this in spite of its experience with the Apollo 1 fire in which it received a tremendous
backlash for trying to control the investigation.

11. Lessons learned
The errors NASA made in its crisis communications regarding the Columbia explosion provide important
lessons for crisis communications professionals. First, if a crisis warrants an investigation, an
organization should ensure that an independent investigation takes place. An organization must not give
in to the desire to protect its image and reputation by trying to control an investigation. Stakeholders will
view such attempts as a sign that an organization has something to hide or that it is not committed to
discovering the actual causes that led to the crisis. As the Columbia case demonstrates, NASA’s attempt to
protect its image and reputation by controlling the investigation had the opposite effect, eliciting questions
and criticism of the space agency. Moreover, stakeholders may dismiss the findings of an investigation if
they believe that an organization has exercised undue influence over that investigation.
Second, an organization should refrain from speculating about the cause of an accident until it has
sufficient evidence to do so. The Columbia example illustrates that an institution’s organizational culture
may make it blind to problems or mistakes. NASA hurt its credibility when, the day after the accident, it
dismissed what turned out to be the cause of the explosion. In short, when faced with a serious crisis, an
organization may be best served by viewing as tentative what it “knows” and not speculating about causes.
Finally, as an organization develops or reviews its crisis communications plan, it should examine its
organizational culture to identify potential problems that may lead to crises or hinder its ability to respond
274 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review31 (2005) 263–275
effectively to crises. An organization’s crisis communications will reflect its organizational culture: the
values, beliefs, norms, assumptions, and practices that characterize the organization. The Columbia case
illustrates that an institution’s organizational culture may blind it to assumptions, practices, and processes
that can lead to a catastrophe and may hinder its ability to respond effectively to a crisis. In many cases,
an organization may need someone outside the organization to examine its organizational culture since
its own employees may be too immersed in the culture to identify values, beliefs, norms, assumptions,
and practices that could lead to crises or hinder the organization’s ability to respond effectively to a crisis.
It remains to be seen how NASA’s response to the Columbia crisis will influence future shuttle flights
and America’s human space exploration program. NASA must address a variety of problems, including
systemic problems with its organizational culture, if it hopes to avoid future shuttle explosions. If it fails to
make necessary changes, it may be forced into the unenviable position of relying on crisis communications
to protect its image and reputation and to maintain good will and trust with stakeholders.


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_________________
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rL1oU6fH25w

[Jason]

I can tell that this thread is going to get a great number of thoughtful responses!

[cloacal kiss]

No DBZwho gives a shit

[Theldorrin]

You're pretty crazy.

[Servbot]

tl;dr

[Big Fagot]

I haven't had to cite a source in so long.

[johnbuisthegreat]

YOUR CRAZY

[Sporkism]

Cite THIS:

*middle finger*

[Mautty]

Cite THIS:

*grabs and shakes package*
_________________

[Magic Juan]

Site this!:

http://tinyurl.com/2q9j9y

[Mautty]

You god damn cock sucker.
_________________

[Big Fagot]

What could that be????

[cloacal kiss]

Whoa awesome vid Magic Juan, everybody should click and check that out.

[johnbuisthegreat]

gosh darn

[L Ron Butterfly]

(16 people respond "You're crazy" without reading the first two posts)

[YES]

Here, Thomas Jefferson talks about odor and musical ability:

http://afroamhistory.about.com/library/bljefferson_slavery.htm

[L Ron Butterfly]

I was so dissapointed when that wasn't a Rick Roll.

[Mike Dunn]

tl;dr

Copy and paste the part where he talks about odor.

[Psarevo]

They secrete less by the kidneys, and more by the glands of the skin, which gives them a very strong and disagreeable odour. This greater degree of transpiration renders them more tolerant of heat, and less so of cold than the whites.

I love reading stuff about BLACK PEOPLE that was written before acknowledging differences between the races became taboo.

You all owe it to yourselves to read the whole thing!

Comparing them by their faculties of memory, reason, and imagination, it appears to me that in memory they are equal to the whites; in reason much inferior, as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anomalous.

Haha, pwned.